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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 05/02/2011 Accident number: 588 
Accident time: 14:10 Accident Date: 04/07/2008 
Where it occurred: Central Demolition Site 
(CDS), Magwi County, 
Eastern Equatoria 
Country: Sudan 
Primary cause: Inadequate training (?) Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Handling accident Date of main report: 11/07/2008 
ID original source: Juba A/01of 2008 Name of source: UNMAO 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: Propellent and 
projectile 
Ground condition: demolition site 
(explosives) 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 05/02/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east: E 31° 59' 21.0. Map north: N 03° 48' 35.6" 
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate training (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 




The report of this accident was made available in 2008. The cover letter of an UNMAO 
independent investigation was supplied, but with no accompanying report apart from the 
demining group’s internal investigation (which appears to have been accepted by UNMAO). 
The conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting being lost.  Text in 
square brackets [ ] is editorial.  
 
United Nations Mine Action Office (UNMAO), Juba Office, Independent Accident 
Investigation – UNMAO/[Demining group]/Juba A/01of 2008 
Introduction
1. In accordance with National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSG’s), the UNMAO 
Deputy Programme Manager issued a written convening order on the 5th July 2008 to 
investigate an incident resulting in injury to [Demining group] international consultant, [Name 
removed]. 
2. The incident occurred at approximately 1400 hours on Friday 4th July 2008 at a [Demining 
group] Central Demolition Site (CDS) in Loa. This report is based on an interview with [the 
Victim] at Level II hospital Juba, conducted by the UNMAO investigating officer on 5th July 
2008, and a [Demining group] internal investigation report into the incident, presented by the 
[Demining group] Operations and Information Officer, [Name removed]. 
Summary
3. Notwithstanding the initial statement taken from [the Victim], I find that the Internal 
Investigation conducted by [the Demining group] to be open, honest and transparent. It 
represents an accurate account on the events if the day that lead to the injuries sustained by 
[the Victim]. 
4. Recommendations made in the internal investigation report should be reviewed and acted 
upon where necessary. 
Signed: [Name removed], QA Officer Juba, Investigation Officer, 17 July 2008 
Attached: [Demining group] Internal Investigation and supporting documentation [No 
supporting documentation was made available.] 
 
Demining group’s internal investigation report 
[Demining group], SOUTH SUDAN MINE/UXO ACCIDENT AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATION 
REPORT 
Reference: 
A. [Demining group] Sudan Internal Investigation Convening Order No. [Demining 
group]SUDAN 01/08 dated 5 Jul 08 
B. Amendment to Convening Order dated 10 July 2008 Part One - Introduction 
Investigation Team 
1. [Name removed], [Demining group] Operations Manager 
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2. [Name removed], [Demining group] Operations, Information & Liaison Officer (under 
instruction) 
3. [Name removed], [Demining group] EOD Team Leader (under instruction). Subsequently 
removed from the team when it became apparent that he was also a witness to certain events 
connected with the accident. See amendment to Convening Order dated [sic]. 
Location of Accident: 
Loa area, Magwi County, Eastern Equatoria, South Sudan 
Coordinates: N 03° 48’ 35.6”, E 31 ° 59’ 21.0. 
Date and time of Accident: 
14.10 (approx), 4 July 2008 
Executive Summary 
[The Victim] was carrying out an unauthorised experiment with UXO near the [Demining 
group] Central Demolition Site at Loa, South Sudan. Contrary to SOPs he was attempting to 
burn out some High Explosive filling which was remaining in an item of UXO using propellant 
from a 23mm cartridge case. He was using matches directly onto the propellant to initiate the 
burn. Although the explosive filling was in an “open” casing of the UXO, it burned to 
detonation which fragmented the casing and resulted in a piece of metal going into the right 
leg, calf muscle area of [the Victim]. 
[The Victim] is not from a military background and is a former paramedic. He has completed a 
similar EOD course as the Team Leaders he is advising and has insufficient knowledge to be 
conducting any experiment, even though he obviously has first world background knowledge 
to supplement this lack of experience. 
It is considered unnecessary to amend either [Demining group] SOPs or NTSGs as this was 
the actions of an individual’s contrary to SOPs, without authorisation and the minimum team 
requirements for any EOD task as already stated in SOPs. 
The credibility of [Demining group] advisors has been adversely affected by this accident 
within [Demining group] operational staff, UNMAO, SSMAA and SPLA/Local authorities in 
Loa. 
Part Two - DETAILS OF ACCIDENT / INCIDENT 
On the 4 Jul 08 [The Victim] remained at the [Demining group] base camp in Loa to assist the 
departure of the other [Demining group] Technical Advisor, [Name removed] and [Demining 
group] teams who were scheduled to deploy to Magwi. 
In the meantime, the two EOD teams remaining in Loa (Teams 2 & 4) deployed as one unit, 
as the Team leader (TL) of EOD Team 4 was ill, to the area where we conduct the burning of 
Small Arms Ammunition (SAA). 
[The Victim] left the camp at approximately 10.45 after informing the Senior Medic, [Name 
removed] that he was going to go to the area where the teams were burning SAA. 
He arrived at the burning area at about 11.00 and after observing the activities of the team he 
informed TL, [Name removed] that he was now going to the CDS to plan and prepare the 
UXO for the demolitions for the following day. 
In addition to planning and organising piles UXO for the demolition, [the Victim] took it upon 
himself to conduct a burning experiment. The teams frequently come across large calibre 
UXO which have already had most of the explosive content removed; however, there is 
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normally a small amount of filling remaining and the projectiles cannot be certified as being 
free from explosives. [The Victim] stated he was trying to find a simple method to destroy 
these or remove the filling, thus making them free from explosive without having to use large 
quantities of demolition explosives. 
There was part of a recoilless projectile, with the tail spigot broken off and only rear part of the 
projectile body remaining, at the CDS. He stuck the tail spigot part in the ground and then 
emptied the propellant from a corroded 23mm cartridge case onto the explosive filling. At that 
stage he had no matches with him to light the propellant. 
At approximately 13.15 [the Victim] returned to the camp and asked the cook at the kitchen 
and asked for a box of matches. He had his lunch at the camp during which time the cook 
gave [the Victim] a box of matches. At approximately 13.40 [the Victim] left the camp having 
informed [the Medic] he was going to the CDS. 
During the time [the Victim] was having his lunch at camp, a woman reported some items of 
UXO to Teams 2 & 4 who were still at the burning area. They investigated the items and 
found they were unfired 82mm mortars and the team decided to take them to the CDS. [The 
Victim] was not at the CDS when they arrived there. While they placed the mortars inside the 
“taped-off” UXO storage area they noticed the recoilless projectile with the tail spigot stuck in 
the ground and the open end that had been filled with grains of propellant. This was about 6 
metres away from the UXO holding area. 
The teams left the area and on reaching the main road at approximately 13.45 and about 1 
km from the CDS they met [the Victim] on his way back to the CDS. He asked them what they 
were doing and the TL informed him. Subsequently the team continued back to camp and [the 
Victim] proceeded to the CDS. 
When [the Victim] arrived back at the CDS he ignited the propellant with a match and this in 
turn caused the filling to burn to detonation and fragment the casing. In [the Victim]’s 
statement he says he checked the result of this burn, thought it had been successful and that 
had gone back to sorting out UXO at the CDS storage area into piles for future demolition 
when the recoilless round exploded. He was hit in the leg by a high velocity fragment and 
applied a field dressing onto the wound before making his way to the vehicle and driving back 
to camp. 
At approximately 14.30 [the Victim] drove into the camp and shouted for the [Name removed] 
the Senior Medic. [The Medic] attended to him and bandaged his right calf. 
[The Victim] telephoned [Name removed], the operations manager who on hearing from [the 
Victim] that there might be a piece of fragment still in his leg advised him to go to the closest 
hospital at Nimule. 
After several minutes [the Victim] rung back and advised the Ops Manager that they were 
going to Juba. It transpired later that they had telephoned the hospital in Nimule and found 
out that X-ray facilities were not available. 
[The Operations Manager] advised them that they would have to get an SPLA escort back to 
Juba as the area is at Security level 3. They went to visit the SPLA and at sometime during 
[the Victim]’s conversation with an SPLA Captain [Name removed] the conversation was 
actually interpreted that [the Victim] might have been shot. The SPLA were understandably 
concerned as there are several SPLA units in the area in addition to suspected other armed 
groups. 
When [the Victim] and escort continued their journey to Juba the TL, [Name removed] and 
SPLA Capt [Name removed] went to the CDS to look around and to see if they could 
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determine what caused the accident. This was done at the request of the SPLA as they were 
concerned that it was indeed a shooting as interpreted at the time of [the Victim]’s meeting 
with the Capt [Name removed] requesting an escort to Juba. 
[The TL] and Capt [Name removed] saw the seat of an explosion where there was still 
blackened soil; the hole where the tail piece of the projectile had been placed in the ground 
was then still visible. They were also able to see where the blood trail started at about 6 
metres from the explosion area. They photographed the site where [the Victim] applied a field 
dressing to the wound. 
The investigating officer visited the UXO storage area where [the Victim] said he had been 
working at the time of the accident/explosion. The four piles of UXO were where he said they 
were, but there was no evidence of an explosion inside the UXO storage area. 
During this investigation on Tuesday 8 Jul there was no evidence of blood remaining on the 
ground as there had been heavy rain the previous day and evening. The bandage wrapping 
was still where it had been dropped. 
Part three – ACCIDENT SITE CONDITIONS 
The area where the accident took place is flat, clear of vegetation but the surrounding area is 
full of dense bush. 
The weather at the time was sunny, no wind and clear blue sky.  
Part four – TEAM AND TASK DETAILS 
The Technical Advisor, [the Victim] was alone in the area. 
[The Victim] is a former paramedic who became a Technical Advisor after completing a Level 
3 EOD course at IMATC in Nairobi in March 2007 
The teams in Loa had been externally QA monitored in June 08 by [Name removed], UNMAO 
QA officer and achieved a satisfactory report. 
The tasking in Loa is SS-473 – GMAA and UXO Clearance Task of the area 
See statements of [the Victim], [Name removed] and [Senior Medic] (attached)  
Part five – EQUIPMENT AND PROCEDURES USED 
No equipment was being used at the time of the accident and PPE was not being worn. The 
procedure used was not in either [Demining group] SOPs or NTSGs. 
The normal operational phase is from the 1st to the 22nd of every month with a stand-down 
from 23rd to the end of the month. 
Teams and TAs usually leave camp at 07.30 in the morning and return to camp from 14.30 
onwards. This is flexible depending on the location and the actual task. 
[The Victim] had been on R&R from the 14–21 June 08. 
Part six – EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS INVOLVED 
The UXO involved were a Recoilless Projectile BK-881 and 23mm projectile propellant. 
The recoilless round was incomplete – tail spigot broken off, no fuse and the forward section 
of the main body was also broken off and missing. 
The propellant was in granular/pellet form which is the same as that found in the cartridge 
case of a 23mm projectile. 
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[Name removed] witnessed the projectile with the tail part stuck in the ground and with the 
open part of the projectile uppermost and filled with propellant granules prior to the accident. 
On the day of the investigation the area was still blackened by the explosion, there were still 
23mm propellant granules in the vicinity of the blackened area. 
Part seven – DETAILS OF INJURIES 
Injured person- [the Victim] suffered a single fragment wound to his right calf. There were no 
other persons involved or in the vicinity. He was admitted to the UNMIS Level 2 hospital in 
Juba where he underwent surgery but they were unable to remove the fragment. [The Victim] 
was subsequently taken to Nairobi by air ambulance and to the Aga Khan hospital where 
surgeon’s removed the fragment 
Part eight – EQUIPMENT/PROPERTY/INFRASTRUCTURE DAMAGE 
 No damage was sustained to any equipment 
Part nine – MEDICAL AND EMERGENCY SUPPORT 
DATE: 4 Jul 2008 
14.10 Time of Accident 
14.12 (estimated) - [the Victim] applies a field dressing to the wound. He stated that he tried 
to call the team on VHF with no response. 
14.30 [the Victim] drives to camp and calls for [the Senior medic] who examines and dresses 
the wound 
14.35-45 [the Victim] telephones the Operations Manager 14.45 Nimule hospital contacted 
but no X-ray facility 
14.55 [the Victim] and [the Senior Medic] travel to the nearby SPLA camp to request a SPLA 
armed escort for journey to Juba 
15.45 Travel to Juba in [Demining group] vehicles 
18.30 Vehicles arrives at [Demining group] office in Juba 
18.40 Vehicles arrives at UNMIS camp in Juba 
19.00 Onwards: 
Taken initially to the Bangladesh Battalion (BanBat) demining company medical facility 
Referred to Level 2 hospital at UNMIS by BANBAT medical staff 
Surgery in an attempt to remove the fragment 
22.00 (approx) Operations Manager advised by the CO of UNMIS Level 2 hospital that air 
evacuation would be required the following day because they could not remove a metal 
fragment 
DATE: 5 Jul 2008 
12.05 Air Ambulance arrives in Juba 
12.40 Air Ambulance departs Juba after pilot files flight plan 
Date: 12 Jul 2008 
[The Victim] re-interviewed at Aga Khan hospital in Nairobi and he writes a second short 
statement that now supersedes his original statement made in the UNMIS Level 2 hospital on 
5 July 08 
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[The Victim] is discharged from hospital and with his wife is conveyed by ambulance to Jomo 
Kenyatta international airport and flown back to UK 
Note: 
1. It is fortuitous that the [Name removed], Deputy Programme Manager, UNMAO was able 
to assist in having [the Victim] admitted to the UNMIS medical facility to deal with the wound 
as [Demining group] personnel are not authorised to receive treatment in this facility. 
2. A letter of entitlement should be sought for access to the UNMIS facility in case of future 
emergencies 
3. The medical insurance company CEGA was initially informed at 1649hrs on 4 July and 
were kept informed on all events. CEGA entered into direct contact with UNMIS doctors and 
made all the air ambulance and subsequent medical arrangements. 
Part ten – REPORTING PROCEDURES 
The reporting requirements were carried out IAW [Demining group] SOPs 
1. The initial accident report was sent at 15.45 on 4 Jul 08 
2. The interim report was sent at 15.08 on 5 Jul 08 
Part eleven – SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 
DATE: 4 July 2008 
14.10 Time of Accident 
14.12(estimated) - [the Victim] applies a field dressing to the wound. He stated that he tried to 
call the team on VHF with no response. 
14.30 [the Victim] drives to camp and shouts for medic- [the Medic] examines and treats the 
wound 14.35 [the Victim] telephones OM 
14.35-45 Nimule hospital contacted- no X-ray facility 
14.55 Travel to SPLA to seek SPLA armed escort for journey to Juba 
15.45 Drive to Juba 
18.00 SPLA Capt [Name removed] and TL 2 visit accident site 
18.30 Vehicles with [the Victim] and escort arrives at [Demining group] office in Juba 
18.45 Vehicles arrive at UNMIS camp in Juba. UNMAO Deputy Programme Manager 
contacted and he escorted vehicles into the UNMIS camp. 
19.00 [the Victim] taken to BANBAT demining company medical facility for cleaning and 
assessment of wound and was then referred to Level 2 hospital at UNMIS. 
After various discussions with doctors [the Victim] was taken to the x-ray department and 
afterwards into the operating theatre. The surgeon was unable to remove the fragment as 
they could only use a local anaesthetic because the UNMIS anaesthetist had gone to 
Khartoum. They had to cut the calf muscle to relief pressure from the internal bleeding. The 
hospital also requested a blood donor (blood group B -ve) and [Name removed] volunteered 
as he had the same blood group. 
22.00 (approx) Advised by CO of Level 2 hospital that air evacuation would be required the 
following day because they could not remove a metal fragment 
DATE: 5 Jul 2008 
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[Name removed] and Capt [Name removed] visit site 
12.05 Air Ambulance arrives in Juba 
12.40 Air Ambulance departs Juba after pilot files flight plan 
DATE: 7 July 2008 
Investigation team travel with armed escort from Juba to Loa 
DATE: 8 July 2008 
Investigation team visit site of accident 
DATE: 9 July 2008 Accident report writing DATE: 11 July 2008 
Operations Manager travels from Loa to Juba with armed escort. 
DATE: 12 July 2008 
Operations Manager travels to Nairobi and re-interviews [the Victim] and obtains another 
statement 
Part twelve – CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Conclusions 
[The Victim] did not admit to carrying out this unauthorised experiment until he was re-
interviewed in Nairobi and presented with the investigation evidence. 
There was confusion and problems regarding the [Demining group] entitlement to access the 
UNMIS Levels 1 & 2 medical facilities. [Demining group] Medevac SOPs state that we should 
go to Unity in the first instance, however their resources to stabilise a potentially serious 
accident victim prior to air evacuation are limited. The Operations Manager contacted [Name 
removed] whose timely intervention made it possible for [the Victim] to be admitted to UNMIS 
facilities. 
The credibility of [Demining group] as an organization and that of the Technical Advisors has 
been adversely affected within the national staff, UNMAO, SSMAA, SPLA and local 
authorities. 
Recommendations 
[Demining group] should request a formal agreement to afford [Demining group] expatriate 
staff access to UNMIS Level 1 & 2 medical facilities, especially in case of accident or illness 
emergencies. [Demining group] has two signed agreements, with UNMAS and UNHCR with a 
third UNDP contract likely in the near future. 
It is recommended that [the Victim] is not employed as a [Demining group] Technical Advisor 
in Sudan after his convalescence. 
[Demining group] should conduct a confidence building exercise involving staff with the 
objective of reviving the professional credibility of [Demining group] TAs. 
[Demining group] should review recruitment procedures to ensure that TAs with appropriate 
qualifications and experience are employed. 
The curriculum and experiential development qualities of the IMAS Level 2 and 3 courses 
currently run at IMATC, Nairobi should be reviewed. This accident and subsequent 
investigation suggest that the courses are not sufficient to produce an expatriate Technical 
Advisor; rather it produces a Team Leader. The courses could, however, be utilised as 
refresher training for experienced international EOD operators should it be necessary. 
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Signed [Name removed], {Demining group] Operations Manager 
14 July 2008 Annexes: [Not made available] 
A. Copy of Initial Accident Report 
B. Witness Statements 
1. [the Victim] 
2. [Senior Medic] 
3. [Team Leader] 
C. Site and Technical Photographs 
D. IMSMA Demining Accident Report 
E. Convening Order and TOR 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 772 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: 5 hours 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: None 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: severe Leg 
COMMENT: No formal medical report was made available.  
The Victim had surgery to remove a single fragment from his leg. A first attempt at surgery to 
do this was reported unsuccessful (9:50 hrs after the accident) and a second attempt was 
successful more than 24 hours after the accident. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Inadequate training” because, as the Demining 
Group recognised in its investigation, the Victim’s EOD training had not prepared him 
appropriately, and seems to have given him an unjustified confidence without the required 
competencies. The secondary cause is listed as a “Management Control Inadequacy” 
because it was the management’s responsibility to train and control its field representatives. 
The Demining Group’s internal investigation appears to have been conducted with 
commendable transparency and its responses to have been both reasonable and humane, so 
correcting its management inadequacy with professionalism.  
This accident is recorded under “Notes” as having “No independent investigation available” 
because the UNMAO QA officer’s “report” does not constitute any kind of investigation. That 
said, the apparent quality of the internal investigation is so unusually high that an independent 
investigation may have been a waste of resources. 
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